All Reports

In 2016, TVA implemented an individual performance multiplier (IPM) that allows managers to adjust employees’ annual Short-Term Incentive lump-sum payouts based on performance. Since alignment between the multiplier and performance are important to the success of the initiative, we scheduled an evaluation of TVA’s IPM. Our objective was to determine if IPMs were in alignment with performance ratings. We reviewed 5,235 adjustable payouts made in fiscal years 2017 and 2018, and found most of the IPM adjustments were in alignment with overall performance ratings.

Based on the importance of the System Operations Center to the transmission system, we performed an evaluation of the site-selection process to determine if the selected site (1) met regulatory requirements and established criteria and (2) provided financial or operational benefits over other potential locations considered.We determined the site selected for the System Operations Center met established criteria and regulatory requirements. However, we could not determine if the site selected provided financial or operational benefits over other potential locations considered.

The Office of the Inspector General audited TVA’s Hydro Generation’s cybersecurity controls. We found TVA had (1) a potential single point of failure that could affect TVA’s ability to operate effectively in the event of a disaster, (2) not configured network devices in a consistent manner, and (3) not maintained updated network documentation. TVA management provided their planned actions to address the recommendations.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of Shawnee Fossil Plant (SHF) to identify operational and cultural strengths and areas for improvement that could impact SHF’s organizational effectiveness. Our report identified strengths that positively affected the day-to-day activities of SHF personnel. These strengths related to (1) organizational alignment, (2) teamwork within working groups and with other SHF departments, (3) effective leadership, (4) positive ethical culture, and (5) resources necessary for job execution.

Due to the risk of incorrectly dispositioning nuclear outage materials, we initiated an evaluation of nuclear outage material management. Our objective was to determine if TVA is managing designated outage material following an outage to maximize use and minimize cost. We determined TVA generally managed designated outage materials to maximize use and minimize cost. Specifically, we found (1) no instances where TVA missed material redeployment opportunities for designated outage materials and (2) all outage items designated for surplus and subsequently repurchased were warranted.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) previously conducted an evaluation of Sourcing (Evaluation 2017-15514, August 17, 2018) to identify strengths and risks that could affect Sourcing’s organizational effectiveness. Our report identified several strengths and risks along with recommendations for addressing those risks. In response to a draft of that report, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) management provided their management decision.

Due to potential risks associated with employee separations where some Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) employees ceased active work prior to their last official day of employment, we included an audit of timely access removal as part of our annual audit plan. Our audit objective was to determine if physical and logical access is removed when employees cease active work prior to retirement or other termination. Our scope included TVA employees whose employment ended during calendar year 2018 who ceased active work prior to retirement or other termination.

We audited the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) executive travel expenses to determine if they complied with Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) and TVA’s policies and procedures. Our audit scope included approximately $1.8 million in TVA executive travel expenses occurring from October 1, 2016, through July 31, 2018.

The Office of the Inspector General audited TVA’s transmission system’s Internet security. We (1) identified vulnerabilities that increase TVA’s risk of successful cyberattacks, (2) found a gap in how TVA’s cybersecurity monitoring system detects cyberattacks against the transmission system, and (3) found TVA had not configured network devices in a consistent manner. TVA management remediated or mitigated all identified vulnerabilities and agreed with our remaining findings and recommendations.

The Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of the Hydro Generation, North Eastern Region (Hydro NE) to identify operational and cultural strengths and risks that could impact Hydro NE’s organizational effectiveness. Our report identified strengths within Hydro NE related to (1) organizational alignment, (2) positive interactions within and outside of Hydro NE, (3) first-line leadership, and (4) positive ethical culture. However, we also identified risks that could impact Hydro NE’s ability to meet its responsibilities in support of Power Operations’ mission.